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The document focuses on a key issue at a European level: The Role of the 
International Monetary Fund and the ideas behind its policy recommendations 
in the design of the bailout packages for the Southern European economies 
during the European Debt Crisis. The document attempts to shed some light on 
the debate around the IMF and its links to the Washington Consensus by 
conducting a quantitative study. Results show that, despite recent claims about 
a shift towards a more flexible framework, to a large extent, the IMF still 
follows the principles first laid out by John Williamson.  
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1. Introduction 
In October 29th, 1929, the Dow Jones lost 30 points, an equivalent of 12% of its 
capitalization. The ‘Black Tuesday’ symbolically marked the beginning of the biggest 
economic crisis of the twentieth century. America’s deep structural problems would shake 
the pillars of the global economy and would question previous economic dogmas. The 
decade that followed would become of extreme importance for the field of economic 
thinking. The Great Depression put an end to the classical school of economics and 
facilitated the rise of a novel approach, promoted by arguably the most influential 
economist of his century, John Maynard Keynes. Keynesianism1 dominated the economic 
policy-making debate in the decades following the Great Depression. Moreover, its views 
contributed to the foundation, in the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, of the two major 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF or The Fund onwards).  
With time, IFIs have become crucial international actors in the field of global economics. 
Hand in hand with globalisation, the World Bank and the IMF benefited from the 
numerous challenges of the second half of the twentieth century and became true 
references in policy-making. Among these events, the 1970s and 1980s stand out as the 
decades when the pillars of the IFI’s were re-founded. Several global dynamics, including 
the rise of floating exchange rates systems, emerging financial globalisation and the rise 
of alternatives to Keynesian policy-making pushed the IFIs to adopt a new perspective on 
global issues (Boughton 2004). Since the late 1980s, the IMF, together with the World 
Bank, began to follow the principles of, what in literature is known as, the Washington 
Consensus. This term refers to the set of policy measures laid out by John Williamson, 
an American economist, in 1989 as a response to the Latin American economic crisis. 
They are commonly identified with a pro-market agenda, advocating, among other 
measures, for fiscal consolidation, trade openness and the elimination excessive 
regulatory barriers. 
Naturally, substantial changes in IFI’s organisations are inevitably related to the big 
challenges that each institution faced. Within this context, just like the Great Depression 
paved the ground for Keynesianism and the 1970s and 1980s crises did for the 
                                                          
1 The IMF defines Keynesianism as the school of thought where “government intervention can stabilize 
the economy”. 
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Washington Consensus, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC)2 opened the window for 
an alternative approach which could challenge the status-quo. In an economy that is more 
interconnected than ever before, IFI’s play a crucial role in addressing diverse global 
economic issues (Bhargava 2006) and could become the catalyst for a change in the 
standing approach to macroeconomic policy.  
Since 2012, scholarship3 has argued that, to some extent, there has been a shift in IMF’s 
ideological position on fiscal policy. They argue that in some countries, the Fund has 
departed from the Washington Consensus framework and has picked up a more flexible 
stand, characterised for prioritising growth over fiscal sustainability. One might argue 
that such a shift in policy preferences might have helped to gather popular support around 
these institutions. On the contrary, the joint intervention by the EU and the IMF has 
spurred a movement of popular discontent with their fiscal policies and its implications 
for the national democratic systems (Streek and Schafer 2013). Considering these 
contradictory dynamics, the questions I intend to answer with this work is: 
To what extent there has there been a shift away from the Washington Consensus in 
IMF’s fiscal policy recommendations for the Southern European economies? 
The European Debt Crisis (EDC) presents a great opportunity to evaluate such change 
since the Fund has embarked on ambitious programs aimed at rebuilding the pillars of 
these economies. That will allow studying the substance of IMF’s policy 
recommendations, helping to establish whether the set of policies proposed by 
Williamson are still the main driver of IMF’s policy preferences. As one of the world’s 
largest economic block, the EU influences economic policy at a global level and could, 
in fact, become the catalyst of a new way of dealing with macroeconomic challenges. 
Thus, it is essential to understand how the IMF has operated in the world’s second-biggest 
economic area and what are the ideas behind these policy recommendations which will 
undoubtedly shape the approach to future economic crises. 
The document is structured in four blocks. First, I present the academic debate around the 
topic and how it has evolved since the 1980s. Second, I describe how and why the IMF 
got involved in the EDC. Here, I also introduce the concept of conditionality. Third, I 
                                                          
2 I refer as Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to the financial turbulence provoked by Lehman’s bankruptcy 
(2008-09). What follows is referred as European Debt Crisis (ECD). It has other names such as European 
Sovereign Crisis.  
3 This will be extensively discussed in the literature review. 
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carry out the analysis, by first describing the method used to evaluate IMF’s policies, and 
then studying the documents in detail. Finally, I summarise the findings and provide a 
concise overview of what the future could look like for the IMF in European terms. In 
addition, an annexe is attached containing the numeric results of the study.   
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2. The State of the Art 
There is a vast amount of literature written on the IMF. Since its foundation in 1944, 
numerous academics, with both economic and non-economic backgrounds, have tried to 
understand the dynamics driving this international institution. These studies have focused 
on a wide set of areas; macroeconomics, financial sector and governance. Additionally, 
since the 1990s, an intense debate has taken place in the ideological arena. This debate 
has addressed the economic ideas behind IMF’s approach to international economics. 
The second half of the twentieth century was the golden age of economic theory. A 
considerable number of events regularly challenged previous economic thinking, clearing 
the path for other theories to take over. Boughton (2004) listed ten events that have 
influenced the IMF throughout its short history. Additionally, he gives an overview of the 
ten ideas that have shaped IMF’s ideological background in such times. From Keynesian 
macroeconomics to the Washington Consensus, stepping on other theories such as 
monetarism or neoclassical economics, the Fund’s ideological basis has been influenced 
by the most prominent economists of all times and schools. Although these studies are 
helpful to understand the Fund’s history, for the matter of this work, I will exclusively 
analyse the literature from the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus was born.4 
The Washington Consensus 
The term Washington Consensus was coined after Williamson proposed a series of 
economic policy recommendations for the Latin American economies in the late 1980s. 
These recommendations were compressed into ten policy points (Williamson 1990) that 
moulded a package of structural reforms encouraged by the IFIs and supported by the US 
government. The plan advocated for economic liberalisation and the reinforcement of the 
role of market forces in the configuration of a new global economy. In a time when 
Keynesian economics, the theory that had dictated economic policy since the Great War, 
was heavily questioned, the Washington Consensus benefited from its simplicity and 
succeeded in securing the pillars of the new global economic governance (Stiglitz 2005). 
Its pro-market agenda matched the upswing of monetarism in the 1980s and the rise of 
conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. As a result, the 
                                                          
4 Developing the previous theoretical debate would take too long for this essay. There are books written 
on each of these topics.  
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Washington Consensus soon became synonymous with a neoliberal agenda.5 Since then, 
the term has been subjected to constant modifications. Williamson himself has, in a 
number of papers, explained how it has adopted a definition that differs from what he 
proposed in the nineties (Williamson 1999, 2008). In a revision of his work, he argued 
that such simplification of the term is an “objectionable perversion of the original 
meaning” (Williamson 2005). Despite considerable efforts from the author, the public, 
and to some extent, scholars, still label the IMF as a neoliberal institution. 
The 2000s debate 
Almost three decades after Williamson’s work, there is still debate on how much the 
Washington Consensus influences the IMF. Yet, this debate is not new. Notably during 
the 2000s, after the Asian financial crises, a wave of revisionism trying to debate the 
effectiveness of such guidelines emerged. Some of its critics, led by prominent academics, 
have argued that the program was incomplete (Rodrik 2006; Stiglitz 2005) and that it was 
often the cause, and not the solution, of major financial crises (Stiglitz 2003)6 and failed 
foreign aid programs (Rodrik 2001). Moreover, other authors have tried to identify in 
what areas it has failed to deliver the expected results (Birdsall, Caicedo and De La Torre 
2010; Ocampo 2005). On the contrary, there were economists who, despite expressing 
the necessity to revise its content, defended the measures undertaken by the IMF. Kenneth 
Rogoff, a former IMF economist, argued that the IMF became the ‘scapegoat’ for many 
government and economists to avoid addressing structural imbalances. By dismantling 
the four major myths about the Fund, he highlighted the key role of the IMF in promoting 
global financial stability (Rogoff 2003). 
Despite these efforts, the Consensus’ reputation had been heavily damaged by the 
financial crises in the 90s and ended up partly giving in to the revisionist’s views. In other 
words, the Washington Consensus was not a consensus anymore. Some views in the other 
major international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations (UN), 
expressed their concerns about the effects of the standing framework and the necessity to 
move towards a post-Washington scheme (Stiglitz 1998; Gore 2000). Excluding some 
                                                          
5 Note that the term Neoliberal has often been misused and requires further explanation. Mirowski (2009) 
provides a historical analysis of the term and where it stands today.  
6 This book is an extensive criticism to the international monetary system overall. The author lists the 
criticism to the IMF from all schools of thought.  
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heterodox scholarship, such as the Austrian School, or strong defenders of monetarism, 
it is fair to say that there was no real support for the set of policies laid out in the initial 
Washington Consensus framework anymore (Rodrik 2006). Even Williamson 
(Kuczynski and Williamson 2003) introduced an updated reform agenda of his previous 
work, embedded in the economic struggle of Latin America. In fact, some authors began 
to argue that the paradigm shift had already begun.  
Overall, two trends arose during the 2000s. First, the effectiveness of the Washington 
Consensus framework was heavily questioned and second, although most economists 
agreed that the IMF was still heavily influenced by its revised version, the shift towards 
another paradigm had already started. 
GFC Impact 
The GFC was a major inflexion point in the debate. Governments tackled the disastrous 
aftermath of Lehman Brother's bankruptcy with a Keynesian approach. Major stimulus 
packages in many OECD countries confirmed the counter-cyclical fiscal policy7 that 
characterised developed economies in previous crises (Marcel 2013). While in many 
developed economies like the US, Canada, the UK or Australia, this approach was 
effective, in the Eurozone, it unveiled major budgetary problems.8 It was then when 
policy makers adopted a new pro-cyclical fiscal policy approach which reminded to the 
old Washington Consensus (Alesina, Barbiero, et al. 2015). Scholarship has extensively 
questioned this approach’s success in solving macroeconomic issues, which can be 
perceived in some of the works produced between 2010 and 2013 against austerity in 
different countries during economic recessions (DeLong and Summers 2012; Holland and 
Portes 2012). Further criticism from famous authors such as Paul Krugman (Krugman 
2011, 2012) unveiled an increasing interest in fiscal policy management and the role of 
fiscal multipliers. 
Fiscal multipliers have become a crucial policy concept. They are defined as “the ratio of 
a change in output to an exogenous change in the fiscal deficit with respect to their 
                                                          
7 I use Alesina’s definition of countercyclical fiscal policy: “[A] policy that follows the tax smoothing 
principle of holding constant tax rates and discretionary government spending as a fraction of GDP over 
the cycle” (Alesina and Tabellini 2005). Likewise, Alesina’s defines procyclical fiscal policy as “a policy 
in which tax rates go down in booms and up in recessions and spending over GDP goes up in booms”. 
The authors note that this is the most used definition in the literature. 
8 See Table 1. Past and expected fiscal behaviour of OECD countries 2007-2013 
by country groupings (% of GDP) (a), (Marcel 2013). 
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respective baselines” (Batini, et al. 2014), and they set the ground for the appropriate 
fiscal policy for each crisis. When a multiplier is above one, a pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
can be devastating for an economy as the GDP will plunge more than one percentage 
point (and vice-versa). Fiscal multipliers were not on top of IMF’s agenda before the 
GFC. In fact, it seemed that there was a consensus within the Fund regarding their 
magnitude. Orthodox economists acknowledged that they had not changed from previous 
years, and it, therefore, made sense to foster measures aimed at fiscal consolidation. 
Estimations by the Fund in the World Economic Outlook Reports (WEO) of 2008 (IMF 
2008a) and 2010 (IMF 2010a) showed that these multipliers had not varied dramatically 
from pre-recession levels. In fact, there was little literature trying to challenge this 
assumption. Nonetheless, the debate reversed some months later. By 2012, the IMF 
expressed its concerns on the underlying magnitude of fiscal multipliers in the Eurozone 
(IMF 2012a). But it was in 2013 when the mainstream stance was questioned (Blanchard 
and Leigh 2013). Olivier Blanchard was, at the time, the IMF Chief Economist. The fact 
that the leading economist at the IMF had publicly accepted that their recommendations 
had probably been based on incorrect economic assumptions was an important inflexion 
point for scholars. The changing role of fiscal multipliers meant that a new window 
opened for academia. 
The Post-Recession Debate 
Contrary to what happened before the GFC, the debate is no longer just on the 
effectiveness of the Washington Consensus. As stated above, the new perception on the 
magnitude of fiscal multipliers has shifted the debate to another area. Pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy lost support and ‘pushed’ policy-makers to move towards a more flexible fiscal 
policy scheme. The new debate questions whether the IMF has undergone a paradigm 
shift, and in that case, in what areas this departure has been most visible. 
The concept of a ‘paradigm shift’ has been a widely covered topic in literature. It has 
been subject to continuous criticism and revision since Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962). One of the most influential works in the economic 
domain has been Peter Hall’s Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case 
of Economic Policymaking in Britain (Hall 1993). By studying the British economy, the 
author evaluates the paradigm shift, from Keynesianism to monetarism, that policy-
making experienced in the 1970s and 80s. Since then, Hall’s definition of a ‘paradigm 
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shift’ has become a crucial concept for the analysis of policy changes. In fact, “[i]f 
scholars want to define a policy paradigm, or find a point of departure to present their 
own argument, they usually start with ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the 
State’” (Cairney and Weible 2015). 
Within this framework, scholarship has approached this issue very differently. First, the 
analysis differs from one set of countries to another. Secondly, the studies have tried to 
assess this potential shift in each of the policy areas where the IMF currently operates. It 
is necessary to state that, according to Hall, a shift in a policy paradigm is a transitional 
process, which means that one cannot argue that the IMF is following either the 
Washington Consensus or a newer framework, but it is rather at a certain stage of a 
transition. While it would be more appropriate to create a ‘scale’ where the classification 
would depict a more accurate picture of the state of the debate, for the simplicity of this 
review, the works cited below are classified into two categories. First, those who believe 
that there has not been a major shift in IMF’s set of premises, these are the stability (status-
quo) supporters, and secondly, those who believe there is enough evidence of an advanced 
transition, the change supporters.  
In the first group, Gabor argues that the IMF prioritised fiscal restraint and opposed 
interest rates reductions which would affect exchange rates and debt accumulation. She 
argues that instead of “cracking the neoliberal armour”, evidence suggests that there is no 
sign of an emerging post-neoliberal IMF (Gabor 2010). Mueller emphasises the 
hegemony of the US in shaping the ideas behind IMF’s policy and how the “little outside 
the box thinking” prevents a departure from its neoliberal agenda (Mueller 2011). In the 
same line as Mueller, Güven (2012), by studying developing economies such as Mexico, 
Thailand and Turkey, writes that, despite considerable efforts in changing its operations, 
rhetoric and priorities, there is little evidence to suggest a paradigm shift in both IMF and 
World Bank’s lending programs. Furthermore, he highlights that the influence of 
developing countries in IMF’s decision-making remains limited. Babb (2013) provides a 
historical analysis of the concept and goes even further arguing that not only 
conditionality, the key instrument of the Washington Consensus, still stands as the IMF’s 
fiscal policy catalyst, but the likelihood that an alternative framework will arise in the 
short term is very small. 
On the other hand, Grabel argues that, despite not having reached another “Bretton 
Woods” momentum, there is enough “uncertainty and aperture in economic ideas” in the 
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developing world that can foster a change in economic ideas behind the IFI’s policy 
paradigm (Grabel 2011). Clegg (2012) believes that a series of operational reforms in 
developing economies after the Great Recession support the shift in IMF’s discourse. 
Others argue that the IMF is no longer the “guardian of economic orthodoxy”, a role 
which has been picked up by the EU in what they call a “European Rescue of the 
Washington Consensus” (Lütz and Kranke 2010). In another article, Lütz, basing her 
analysis on Hall’s paradigm framework, explains that the IMF is in the process of a 
paradigm shift in its lending policy, but it “has not yet materialised” (Lütz 2015). Finally, 
Broome (2010) uses the credit crunch during the GFC to explain the more flexible 
position of the IMF. 
The works cited above cover the latest analysis of IMF’s fiscal policy recommendations. 
Nonetheless, as previously stated, other authors have studied other policy areas. Probably 
the most accurate synopsis of the literature about the IMF its paradigm shift is provided 
by Governance (2015). A series of seven papers which focuses each on a different policy 
area and depicts a clear picture of the latest IMF’s actions. A clear but concise summary 
can be found in the first paper (Ban and Gallagher 2015). First, they provide an overview 
of the debates that have taken place in the last few years by summarising the literature on 
financial sector policy, international organisations policy dynamics in general and more 
specifically, the agency of IMF’s staff as the guardians of the status-quo or the catalyst 
for change. Secondly, the paper argues that there is evidence of a stronger shift towards 
flexibility in financial issues while the same conclusion is not so clear regarding fiscal 
policy. The latter is further discussed by Ban (2015) who attempts to clarify IMF’s official 
stand in the debate between austerity and stimulus by studying the ideological change 
within the Fund. He argues that, while credibility in financial markets remains the main 
concern of the IMF, the institution is now more open to fiscal stimulus and a more flexible 
consolidation of public accounts. Broome (2015) concludes that there are two patterns in 
IMF’s policy recommendations compared to the 1980s and 1990s. First, the IMF still 
considers fiscal consolidation as one of its main goals. Second, there has been a shift away 
from structural reform demands. In other words, there has not been a paradigm shift, but 
the policy recommendations areas have narrowed in the last 20 years. Additionally, Erce 
(2015) highlights the mismatch between IMF’s latest concern on domestic demand in 
times of crises and the discrimination of domestic creditors in debt repayments after 
conditionality application. The other papers put a bigger emphasis on financial issues. 
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Gallagher (2015) studies the role of the IMF in capital liberalisation and capital flows 
management and its relationship with the increasing importance of BRICS at the 
international institution. Gabor (2015), puts the emphasis on how IMF’s new perspective 
in global banking interconnectedness has not been implemented properly and has become 
a strategy rather to “build global credibility”. Finally, Seabrooke and Nilsson (2015) give 
another insight into the Fund’s staff dynamics by studying the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP). These works provide useful insights to understanding 
IMF’s operations and therefore some of them, especially on the operations debate, are 
analysed. Nevertheless, in most cases, they differ from the main goal of this paper and 
will not be included in the study. 
While it may seem that scholarship has tackled this issue and the question has been 
answered, most of these studies have focused on developing economies. Although the 
Governance Issue includes more cases than the individual works mentioned above, there 
is very little emphasis on the role of the IMF in European terms. Schwarzer (2015), who, 
introducing the concept of ‘learning’, explains how and why the EU modelled its crisis 
approach around IMF’s structure and previous practices, provides a deeper insight. In the 
same direction, Seitz and Jost (2012) give a timeline of IMF’s involvement, motivations 
and pros and cons behind this intervention. Moreover, Bohn and De Jong (2011) try to 
explain how the EDC was highly influenced by the differences between the two major 
European players, Germany and France, and how they contributed to the increasing 
uncertainty about the future of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Finally, some 
authors explain the difficulties encountered by the IMF in its policy implementation at a 
European scale and the growing relevance of the financial sector within IMF’s policy 
mix. They argue that a transition from the “it’s mostly fiscal” IMF to the “it’s mostly 
financial and fiscal” is necessary (Véron 2016). 
While these works provide a valuable insight into different policy areas, none provides a 
comprehensive analysis of IMF’s fiscal policy potential shift in European terms. In the 
next section, I set the ground for such analysis by explaining why and how the IMF got 
immersed in such a complex process. 
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3. Setting the Ground – The IMF, Member States and Conditionality. 
Worrying Signs 
On October 18th, 2009, the recently-elected Greek Prime Minister, Yorgos Papandreou, 
announced that Greece’s deficit forecast was to be revised upwards from 6.7% to 12.7%. 
The announcement wiped out any remaining investors’ confidence in Greece’s solvency. 
Within weeks, the Greek bond spread rose to unsustainable levels9 and marked the 
beginning of the EDC. Since then, the EU has entered the most uncertain economic 
juncture in its brief history. In the process, there have been numerous attempts to soften 
the impact of such crisis, improve the European economic governance framework and 
ensure the long-term sustainability of the common currency. 
The causes of the Greek crisis are profound. Both domestic and international factors have 
contributed to the lead-up of such situation.10 The sudden shift of markets’ expectations 
was bound to happen as the underlying pillars of the Greek economy had shown signs of 
chronical imbalances. Both the government and the private sector had developed a large 
dependence on external funding. Over the years, the slow growth of productivity and 
steady increase of prices relative to other Eurozone member states (EMS) had placed 
pressure upon Greece’s competitiveness and its current account (Gibson, Hall and Tavlas 
2011). Simultaneously, fiscal indiscipline had become the rule as primary deficits were 
used to fund wage and pension increases above productivity growth levels (Wyplosz and 
Sgherri 2016). As a result, Greece suffered from the ‘twin deficit’ phenomenon which 
quickly translated into the highest debt to GDP ratio in the Eurozone.11 Thus, any 
difficulty in accessing funding would unveil a major crisis of arguably, the weakest 
economy of the Eurozone. Despite these factors, Greece managed to weather the GFC 
relatively well as access to global financial markets remained stable, allowing it to cover 
its short-term obligations (Nelson, Belkin and Mix 2010). In the immediate aftermath of 
Lehman’s collapse, the fiscal stimulus put in place by most OECD members helped 
containing the stress in European financial markets. Notwithstanding, the prospects for 
the Greek economy darkened after the publication of the ‘hidden’ deficit figures and 
                                                          
9 The 10-year Bond spread more than quadrupled between the end of 2009 and mid-2010 (Gibson, Hall 
and Tavlas 2011) 
10 There is a vast amount of literature written on this topic which will not be discussed here. For a brief 
overview from two different perspectives visit (Lane 2012). 
11 IMF WEO Database. 
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steered rating agencies into evaluating Greece’s solvency. By early 2010, the Greek 
sovereign bond had been downgraded to ‘junk bond’. As the unexpected events unfolded, 
investors’ concerns began to spread to other member states with, potentially, similar 
issues. 
The EU’s lack of experience in dealing with such situations became evident after the first 
few weeks under speculative pressure. Initially, there was a lot of confusion regarding 
which policy choice was the better solution to the Greek problem. At the beginning of 
2010, the situation was regarded as a Greece-only issue which could be handled by just 
coordinated European action (Schwarzer 2015). For several weeks, EU and national 
officials, including Germany, sought to mitigate markets’ volatility by repeating that the 
Euro is by itself, a guarantee of the solvency of its members. In other words, according 
to European officials, the mechanisms enshrined in the Treaties would be enough to tackle 
a problem of such magnitude. Within this context, the concept liquidity crisis took shape 
(Schwarzer 2015). To calm markets down and prevent uncertainty to spread to other 
EMS, the EU’s main obsession became to fund this short-term liquidity gap. Intervention 
was, nonetheless, far from being a politically painless process. Notably on the Northern 
member states, officials faced increasing popular discontent with the Euro and the 
EMU.12 Any measure targeted at transferring funds to a budgetary ‘irresponsible’ EMS 
would entail a high political cost. 
Nevertheless, the problem had reached such magnitude that the debate of a joint response 
could no longer be avoided. In early 2010, the Greek budgetary hole had derived into 
questions about the sustainability of other European members’ accounts. Fears of a 
potential contagion spiced up as the spreads of the Irish and Portuguese sovereign bonds 
peaked. More worryingly, investors pointed to Spain and Italy as possibly the next to 
follow. In other words, the crisis had gone from a Greece-only problem to a systemic 
nature that threatened the pillars of the common currency. By March 2010 it was obvious 
to European officials that a major strategy was needed. Indeed, beyond simply negotiating 
a package of financial assistance, the conversations paved the road for a newer 
framework, needed to counteract markets’ recent behaviour. As Schwarzer puts it; “[i]n 
                                                          
12 In Germany, Netherlands, Austria and Finland, scepticism towards the common currency was at its 
highest in early 2010. Eurobarometer, “Irrespective of other details of the Maastricht Treaty, what is your 
opinion on each of the following proposals? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or 
against it. There has to be a European monetary union with one single currency, the Euro”.  
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/17/groupKy/80 
Álvaro Portes Navarro 
13 
 
order to contain a crisis driven by market expectations, a big ‘ﬁrewall’ needs to be 
constructed that market participants see as able to fend off a substantially bigger crisis” 
(Schwarzer 2015) 
The talks intended to solve the first problem encountered many difficulties as the 
European legal scheme was not designed to deal with problems of such nature. Firstly, 
the European economic governance framework had shown strong signs of chronical 
weakness in the preceding years of the EDC. Unlike the IMF, who was heavily involved 
in the Asian and Latin American financial crises, the EU and the Commission had not 
faced a comparable situation before. Consequently, the need for a mechanism ensuring 
short-term liquidity access had rarely arisen. The framework established in Maastricht 
consisted in two ‘arms’; preventive and reactive. The ‘reactive’ arm of the GSP consists 
exclusively in the possibility to impose sanctions on a member state which does not 
comply with such requirements, but the possibility of financial assistance is legally ruled 
out by European law (Article 125 TFEU). On the contrary, the EU had put the emphasis 
on the ‘preventive’ side of the equation. The budgetary restrictions established in 
Maastricht were intended at ensuring that member states would never reach the point of 
needing external financial assistance. However, as data shows, the enforcement of such 
mechanism has been far from being effective (Feld, et al. 2015). With the possibility of a 
‘bail-out’ package ruled out, many relied on the central bank to stabilise markets by 
purchasing sovereign bonds. This approach, where the central bank acts as the ‘lender of 
last resort’, however, is also not applicable at a European level. The ECB is prohibited 
from purchasing bonds on the primary market (Article 123 TFEU). 
In addition to being legally restrained, both the Commission and ECB faced internal 
hurdles that stopped them from intervening efficiently. Macroeconomic models within 
the Commission and ECB had, since its foundation, been embedded in the SGP, thereby 
prioritising budgetary compliance over macroeconomic stability. (Schwarzer 2015). 
When the crisis adopted a systemic dimension, these models failed to evaluate policy 
options on a European scale effectively. 
Within this context, by spring 2010, the systemic nature of the crisis, the legal constraints 
faced by European economic actors and the institutional lack of capacity had opened the 
gate for external help. European officials, not without exceptions, turned to the IMF as 
the most capable international actor. 
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Internal Differences 
An IMF intervention of a developed economy in the EU would be a ground-breaking 
event. Apart from Iceland in 2008, the last time the IMF had granted financial assistance 
to a developed economy was in the 1970s, when the UK requested the largest IMF loan 
to that date (The National Archives). Although in a Eurozone context the IMF historical 
record was non-existent, the Fund had already gathered some experience in dealing with 
the EU institutions. In late 2008, Hungary applied for financial assistance after the GFC 
had hit its public accounts. The IMF, through the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), and the 
EU, through the Balance-of-Payments (BoP) Assistance Facility, provided a €20 billion 
loan subject to a fiscal adjustment plan and reinforcement of capital requirements in the 
banking sector (IMF 2008b). Several months later, similar programs were agreed by the 
two institutions to assist Latvia (IMF 2008c) and Romania (IMF 2009). In a way, this 
served as a precedent in IMF-EU joint programs, thereby establishing the guidelines for 
future cooperation. Nevertheless, the Greek case was different in two levels. First, Greece 
was a Euro member. Secondly, the bail-out package, in this case, would have to be 
substantially larger. 
For these reasons, the involvement of the IMF in Eurozone affairs became a highly 
controversial debate, especially between the French-German axis. As mentioned above, 
many officials openly opposed the idea, and some viewed the direct involvement of the 
IMF as a sign of weakness.  German and French finance ministers both publicly opposed 
the involvement of the IMF (Kincaid 2016). On the French side, however, there are 
cultural patterns that explain the more sceptical position towards the IMF and its 
involvement in European affairs. President Sarkozy himself remained reluctant to this 
option because the IMF is a “US-dominated institution despite the fact that a Frenchman 
is the managing director” (Bohn and De Jong 2011). The French had always been 
sceptical of IMF’s Anglo-Saxon approach to crisis management. Furthermore, contrary 
to its German partners, the French have traditionally opposed being restrained by the 
automatic rules applied by the Fund. But the fiercest opposition arose within the ECB, 
who perceived IMF’s involvement as a sign of humiliation. The Trichet-led institution 
argued that a European-only solution, via implementation of bilateral loans programs and 
the enforcement of the GSP, would be enough to overcome short-term instability. This 
reasoning lies in ECB’s perception on conditionality application, which is now stricter 
than IMF’s (Lütz and Kranke 2010). Within the ECB, in a long-term perspective, the IMF 
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was regarded as nothing, but a threat to price stability and the stricter rules set out in the 
GSP, a view that was shared by some officials within the Commission (Schwarzer 2015). 
Thus, when in May 2010, the EU, together with the IMF, had committed to a first Greek 
bailout package, it was perceived as an “embarrassment for the ECB” (Atkins, Thornhill 
and Hall 2010).  
If there was such a large opposition, why did the EU finally involve the IMF? As 
mentioned above, the systemic nature of the crisis acted as a wake-up call for several 
European actors, including German and French officials who now repeated that the Euro 
is a one-way project. French President demanded “a compromise from everyone to 
support Greece” (Tremlett, Wray and Fletcher 2010) and Angela Merkel, in an attempt to 
gather support around the bailout package, assured that if the Euro collapses "then Europe 
and the idea of European union will fail” (Spiegel Online 2010). Part of the European 
public opinion, which saw the rescue package as a violation of European rules and the 
establishment of a dangerous precedent, did not share this economic rationale (Kulish 
2010). While Sarkozy easily bypassed this opposition, it was a bump in the German road. 
A possible explanation is the considerable differences in their national decision-making 
processes respectively. The German system “requires Merkel to take a much more 
guarded approach” and look for a consensus around major decisions, whereas in France 
“the presidential system allows Sarkozy to push ahead with his political agenda” (Bohn 
and De Jong 2011), thereby granting him more power over major initiatives. Within this 
context, IMF’s impressive repayment record13 was used as leverage by European 
officials, including Merkel, who saw in the IMF the perfect ‘scapegoat’ to raise support 
for intervention in the Greek crisis. By involving the IMF, whose experience in sovereign 
debt crises was much more reliable than the Commission’s, taxpayers’ concerns over the 
possibility of a default would be softened, facilitating the domestic ratification of such 
package.    
Bailing another EMS out might solve the short-term implications of a financial meltdown, 
but it raises a well-known problem for economists, moral hazard. In effect, some 
European officials advocated for a Greek bankruptcy as it would eliminate this risk in the 
future. Thus, if the EU was to soften these claims, it had to ensure that the programs were 
based on strong conditionality mechanisms. To back IMF’s involvement, some pundits 
                                                          
13 Virtually nil, according to Rogoff (2002). 
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argued that the Commission, despite its presumed independence, was “too close” to 
European politicians (Schwarzer 2015), which would compromise the correct 
implementation and surveillance of conditionality. As I will explain in the next section, 
IMF’s programs are not released in full at the beginning but rather consist in periodical 
disbursements. Thus, the IMF can, not only, withhold a future payment but can also 
threaten to exercise its right to withdraw from the program, an action that would not be 
credible if the Commission or member states did. 
Finally, beyond strategic objectives and political goals, a joint program also had other 
hidden positive externalities at an operational level. First, there was a mutual benefit from 
both institutions expertise. This framework would allow both institutions to benefit from 
an increased exchange of information. While the IMF would provide the technical 
knowledge and experience in financial crisis management, the EU would enable the 
program to be embedded in a broader policy context (Seitz and Jost 2012). Secondly, 
IMF’s resources are far ahead DG ECFIN’s regarding manpower, especially during a time 
when IMF’s lending activity was very limited (Schwarzer 2015) 
But not only was the EU interested in getting the IMF on board. The Fund also ‘pushed’ 
to be part of the solution. Over the previous years, the IMF was regarded as an obsolete 
institution, especially after the rise of Asian powers’ current account surpluses which now 
funded a big share of global debt needs (Seitz and Jost 2012). The involvement in the 
EDC would put the IMF back in the headlines, and it would turn around the worsening 
reputation that it had picked after the Asian financial crises. Its governance structure also 
contributed to its involvement. As an IFI, its members ‘share’ the right to act. 
Nevertheless, the US and EU represent a big share of the voting powers.14 With the US 
on board because of several reasons, the fact that the Executive Board must give its 
consent to an agreement would also mean that minimum requirements regarding 
conditionality would have to be agreed. 
Overall, from the European side, an IMF’s involvement would send a credible message 
to investors, which would ultimately soften the pressure placed upon Southern European 
bond spreads and allow the institutions to have more time to negotiate new mechanisms. 
Furthermore, complementarity and mutual learning at an operational level would translate 
                                                          
14 The EU holds approximately 30% of the votes in the Executive Board. It the US support the EU, this 
climbs to more than 46%. IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power; 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx 
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into a more efficient and credible bailout program. On IMF’s side, the possibility to 
restore its reputation and the strong presence of EU members at the highest managerial 
level were the major drivers of the Board’s approval of the program. 
The Aftermath of the Greek Crisis 
As aforementioned, Greece’s crisis unveiled the need for both the reinforcement of the 
GSP framework and the set-up of reacting mechanisms for future similar crises. At the 
first level, European institutions came with several proposals. The ‘Six Pack’ 
strengthened the surveillance and clarified the conditions of the macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure (MIP). Later in 2012, the European Fiscal Compact15 deepened the 
commitment of EMS by establishing the ‘golden rule’ of a lower limit of a structural 
deficit of 0.5%. On the other side, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and 
European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) were set up in May 2010 as emergency 
mechanisms to guarantee short-term financial stability. The larger of them, the EFSF, was 
portrayed as a European scheme, where the Commission would provide its technical 
input, but in effect, it was the member states who would ultimately take the decisions in 
the European Council. Therefore, the political constraints previously experienced were 
not eliminated (Gocaj and Meunier 2013). As the crisis spread, the necessity of a 
permanent mechanism began to arise. In effect, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
replaced the EFSF and EFSM in September 2012 in an attempt to contain the stress in the 
financial markets. The relevance of the IMF at a European level is visible on the bases of 
the newly-established mechanisms. Not only they are modelled upon IMF’s best 
practices, but they formally refer to co-lending as the preferred option, thereby ensuring 
future cooperation between the two institutions (Schwarzer 2015). In a matter of months, 
the EU had shifted from an anti-IMF position to ensuring its contribution in the future of 
its crisis management mechanisms.  
In this section, I have explained the complexities of an IMF’s involvement in the initial 
stages of the EDC. Despite all efforts, the Greek crisis quickly adopted a European 
dimension. In November 2010, Ireland, following a €64 billion government bailout to 
rescue one of the most leveraged banking sectors in Europe, requested financial assistance 
for an amount of €85 billion. In May 2011, it was Portugal who communicates the 
                                                          
15 Officially named ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union’. 
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Commission that it is not able to roll over its short-term debt and needs from external 
help. Also in 2011, conversations are set for a second bailout package for Greece, which 
eventually is concluded in early 2012 and included a 53% write off the face value of 
privately-owned sovereign bonds (ESM). Despite a relatively stable start of 2012, in 
summer, uncertainty intensifies, and bond yields start to increase. By October 2012, it 
was the Spanish banking system which had to be granted an emergency funding line. 
Finally, in 2015, the Greek government asks for further funds to meet its short-term debt 
repayments. Amidst national political uncertainty, the details of this package have yet to 
be agreed. Table 1 summarises the bailout packages put in place by both the IMF and the 
EU. 
Table 1 – Bail-Out packages in the Eurozone. 
 
European Union IMF TOTAL 
 
EFSM EFSF ESM Bilateral Loans SBA EFF 
 
Greece I - - - €80b16 €30b - €110b 
Greece II - €102b - - - €28b €130b 
Greece III - - €85b17 - - - €85b 
Ireland €22.5b €22.5b - €4.8b18 - €22.5b €85b 
Portugal €26b19 €26b - - - €26b €78b 
Spain - - €100b20 - - - €100b 
Source: IMF and European Commission 
  
  
                                                          
16 Reduced by €2.7b when Slovakia withdrew and Greece and Ireland were excluded because of national 
financial problems. 
17 Negotiations are still ongoing. IMF's exact contribution is to be determined. 
18 The Irish government contributed with €17.5b (€10b by the National Pension Reserve Fund & €7.5b in 
cash resources). 
19 Concluded the program having used €24.3 in the end. 
20 Spain ‘only’ used €38.9 billion for the banking sector recapitalization and €2.5 billion for the 
capitalization of Sareb, the national asset management fund. 
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4. Conditionality 
As mentioned in the previous section, IMF’s disbursements are subject to 
‘conditionality’. Conditionality is defined by the IMF as “program-related conditions 
intended to ensure that Fund resources are provided to members to assist them in 
resolving their balance of payments problems in a manner that is consistent with the 
Fund’s Articles and that establishes adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the 
Fund’s resources” (IMF 2002). In other words, conditionality is IMF’s tool to guarantee 
that receiving members successfully repay programs’ funds. In practice, conditionality is 
part of a broader strategy which attempts to “restore or maintain the balance of payments 
viability and macroeconomic stability while setting the stage for sustained, high-quality 
growth and, in low-income countries, for reducing poverty” (IMF 2017a). 
It is necessary to state that conditionality is not an IMF-exclusive tool. To some extent, 
similar practices exist in all private lending contracts where the principal does not have 
access to full information about the agent and its practices. In a market of such nature, 
asymmetric information leads to both adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Khan 
and Sharma 2006). While in private lending contracts, the principal demands collateral 
to avoid these issues, a sovereign state with financial difficulties can rarely offer any 
internationally accepted assets. Thus, the IMF must place certain measures as a condition 
for lending members to ensure that the funds made available are being repaid. In effect, 
conditionality acts as the collateral in IMF-Members contracts. 
Understanding conditionality is a requirement to understand the ideas behind IMF’s 
lending policy. Babb affirms that for the Washington Consensus, conditionality was the 
core mechanism to extend its principles worldwide effectively (Babb 2013).  Over the 
years, IMF’s guidelines on conditionality have encoded these lending principles. The 
document, which is regularly updated, contains other features that apply to IMF’s lending 
policy. 
First, conditions are adjustable to specific sovereign economic characteristics. At least on 
paper, the IMF takes into account the different circumstances of its members. Yet, this 
reasoning clashes with the one-size-fits-all approach that has characterised the Fund’s 
conditionality for a long time (Babb 2013). In general, the IMF acknowledges both 
member’s past performance and future economic prospects at the time of designing a 
program, which means that for certain projects, receiving members must qualify by 
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complying with pre-established requirements. Secondly, the IMF protects itself against a 
potential default by releasing the funds in several timeframes. In theory, these principles 
attempt to mitigate the risk of sovereign default by constituting two levels of 
conditionality; ex-ante and ex-post. While the first one seeks to prevent nations from 
delaying requesting IMF aid (worsening economic conditions could entail more painful 
pre-program measures), the second one impedes receiving parties to take gambles once 
the IMF unlocks the funds.  
Only then, receiving states have the incentive to implement the reforms previously 
negotiated. When it comes to implementation, the IMF applies what they call ‘country 
ownership’, which means that, while reforms must deliver results in compliance with 
Fund’s requirements, it is the receiving state who is responsible for designing and 
implementing such measures. With this mechanism, the IMF seeks to tone down claims 
about national sovereignty violation. Moreover, the Fund only demands conditionality on 
the issues that have critical importance for macroeconomic stability. These variables and 
structural reforms are usually embedded in three fields: Monetary, fiscal and exchange 
rate policies.  
Although conditionality is a relatively stable tool, it has been subject to considerable 
criticism, especially since the 1990s, when it was heavily blamed for its rigid approach to 
the Asian and Latin American crises.  Previously, in the 80s, conditionality had helped 
install the Washington Consensus framework around the world. Also, the complexities of 
the rising number of states needing financial assistance enabled conditionality to expand 
beyond fiscal consolidation, its traditional domain, and embrace the task of providing 
unwelcomed recommendations such as industry privatisation (Babb 2013). Altogether, 
conditionality was the main contributing factor to why the IMF was, and is still, regarded 
as a neoliberal institution. 
To prevent this perception from spreading, the IMF has constantly reshaped the rhetoric 
around its application. Since the release of the first guidelines notes in 2003, four 
additional modifications have followed. The 2005 and 2008 reforms preceded the 2009 
revision, where new mechanisms were designed to improve IMF’s lending activity. The 
Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Precautionary Liquidity Line (PLL) and urgent balance 
of payments needs mechanisms, Rapid Financing Instrument (PFI) and Rapid Credit 
Facility (RCF) were added to previous practices. In addition, the 2012 staff discussion 
highlighted the improvements in advancing towards a more flexible framework after 
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adopting the lessons from previous crises experiences. Finally, the 2014 revision (IMF 
2014a) tries to incorporate new language aimed at improving the “macro-social” 
dimension of programs’ implementation. In this line, the IMF should “make every effort 
to accommodate their preferences and policy choices—including on growth, labour 
market and distributional targets” or “assist members in broadening support for sound 
policies” (IMF 2014a) among other guidelines.  
On a general note, recent developments have, at least on paper, advanced towards a 
broader and more flexible approach, which is arguably visible at a European level, where 
certain actors complained about the severity and rigidity of conditionality application in 
the initial stage of the EDC. This stance was, nevertheless, not enforced by the IMF but 
rather by the Commission, the ECB and several member states who refused to accept an 
upfront debt restructuring that would have resulted in a reduced rescue package and laxer 
policy conditions (IEO 2016). 
In the next chapter, I proceed with the analysis of fiscal policy recommendations. 
Inevitably this will involve an extensive study of conditionality. The goal is to test 
whether the novel approach applies to the European situation. To do this, first, I present 
the analytical framework and then I conduct the analysis. 
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5. Methodological Framework 
The analysis of policy recommendations is not an easy task. There are two hurdles that 
one must overcome to conduct an accurate study. First, policy recommendations are 
rarely expressed in quantitative terms. It is true that the EU establishes annual goals on, 
for instance, public deficit numbers, but it seldom specifies how to accomplish these goals 
quantitatively. Thus, the analyst is subject to the risk of subjectively classifying such 
recommendations. It is obvious that, for example, the reference to a ‘fiscal contraction’ 
will be addressed differently by Keynesian and monetarist economists. Secondly, the 
withdrawal of valid conclusions is conditional to the size and consistency of the sample. 
In IMF terms, this becomes a challenging process as there are numerous technical 
complexities regarding IMF’s policy instruments and official documents. Likewise, the 
Fund is inevitably influenced by external actors and institutional norms that differ from 
one set of countries to another. Consequently, it would be a statistical error to include in 
the same sample members and non-members of the Eurozone. Thus, it is essential to 
design a framework that, if not eliminates, at least mitigates the risk of making such 
mistakes, which involves, first, a system that quantitatively codes policy 
recommendations of a qualitative nature, and second, the selection of countries and 
documents that can be compared in time. 
A more concrete challenge is the wide scope of IMF’s policy recommendations. Trying 
to address all of them would lead to a very long and complex process. It is crucial then to 
focus in one specific area, which can later be isolated, disaggregated and deeply studied. 
The ten points introduced by Williamson (1990), which are the pillars of the Washington 
Consensus, can be split into three big policy areas: Fiscal policy, monetary and trade 
policy and legal and structural changes. In the next table, the main policy focuses on each 
policy areas are summarised.  
Table 4.1 
Policy Focus Policy Nature 
Fiscal Deficits  
Fiscal Policy Public Expenditure Priorities 
Tax Reform 
Interest Rates  
Monetary and Commercial Policy The Exchange Rates 
Trade Policy 
Foreign Direct Investment 
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Privatization  
Regulatory and Structural Changes Deregulation 
Property Rights 
Source: (Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform 
1990) 
 
One might argue that monetary policy and structural changes are as important as fiscal 
policy and that the analysis of all three would provide a more accurate picture. 
Nevertheless, there are two realities that ‘push’ the analysis towards fiscal policy. First, 
when Eurozone Member States (EMS) committed to the EMU, monetary policy instantly 
became an EU-exclusive competence, thereby making impossible to establish a multi-
country analysis. Moreover, unlike other developing economies, where the financial 
sector is considerably underdeveloped, and the IMF can exert more influence, EU’s 
monetary and financial governance framework is relatively solid, and it is more difficult 
for the IMF to intervene. Secondly, EU membership, notably within the Eurozone, is in 
itself a guarantee of stable regulatory frameworks where legal and structural matters 
concerning property rights and regulation are both highly developed and influenced by 
the EU (Poulsen, Bonnitcha and Yackee 2015). In general, the EU regulatory framework 
is among the best-designed systems at a global scale, making further measures almost 
unnecessary. Fiscal policy, on the contrary, is the most powerful economic tool that EMS 
still retain. It is indeed, as mentioned in the previous chapters, the underlying cause of the 
Greek crisis and the EDC. Overall, studying IMF’s evolution based on fiscal policy allows 
the analysis to have a bigger sample, to establish comparisons and to understand the 
policy area where the IMF can exert more influence. 
Fiscal policy has three functions; ensure macroeconomic stability, resources allocation 
and income distribution (Roy and Almeida Ramos 2012). While IMF’s policy 
recommendations address all of them, the fact that its members apply for financial aid in 
times of economic difficulties, make macroeconomic stability stand out. In the past, a 
series of monetarist assumptions reinforced the Washington Consensus’ narrative which 
claimed that budget deficits threaten macroeconomic stability (Gabor 2010). Thus, to 
stabilise the economic activity, policy recommendations must be aimed at achieving 
sustainable public accounts. To the three levels of fiscal policy previously proposed; 
primary deficit reductions and public sector and tax reforms, another policy action could 
be added; labour market reform, both for the private and the public sector. Despite 
standing between a fiscal measure (i.e. public-sector wage reductions) and a structural 
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reform (i.e. collective bargaining modifications), calls for wage moderations have been 
popular among European policy makers during the EDC and therefore makes sense to 
include them in the analysis. To obtain a more accurate result, it is necessary to 
disaggregate each of these policy actions into specific recommendations further. 
Table 4.2 
 
Fiscal Consolidation + 
Sustainability 
Reduction of Fiscal Deficit/GDP 
Reduction of Public Expenditure/Spending 
Reviews 
Public Debt Sustainability Measures 
 
Tax Revenue 
Broadening the Tax Base 
Increase on income or consumption taxes 
Enabling Tax Incentives 
 
Public Sector Reform 
Reduction or freezing of Civil Employment 
Reduction or elimination of benefits and 
pensions 
Labour Market Reform Wages: Level, Structure and Public Sector 
Source: (Broome 2015) and personal modifications. 
 
While Broome uses this classification to test the possible changes at a global level, 
including countries with very distinct characteristics, I only focus on countries subject to 
similar legal and institutional rules. It goes without saying that the EU has exerted some 
influence in the design of the bailout packages and that, due to the distinct size of these 
packages, policy recommendations will slightly differ from one country to another. But, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter, IMF’s best practices have become the basis of EU’s 
economic governance and therefore are similar enough to include them in the same study. 
With the purpose of coding qualitative concepts into a quantitative term, I ‘count’ how 
often the policy actions described above are explicitly mentioned in each of the reports 
referring to EMS economic policy-making. Nonetheless, this procedure poses a problem 
regarding the documents used by the IMF to ‘communicate’ its position. Some of the 
EMS have received financial help, while other have not, or have received only indirectly. 
That is why I analyse the reports in two groups. First, I will test Spain and Italy, two 
economies that, despite having remained out of IMF’s direct supporting programs,21 
involve a systemic risk for the European and, in extension, global economy. I will follow 
up with the analysis of the three economies that have received direct IMF funds; Greece, 
                                                          
21 In chapter 2, I explained how an emergency funding line was enabled for the Spanish banking system 
by the ESM, but the government remained out of any bail-out programs designed by the IMF. 
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Portugal and Ireland. Finally, I exclude Cyprus from such analysis because of the 
relatively small size of its economy and the bailout package.22  
As the two groups have distinctive characteristics, it is necessary to use different 
documents. The cases of Spain and Italy imply a more general approach, where the IMF 
can only play a supervisor and advisor role. There is a slight difference as Spain was 
granted access to ESM funds. While the IMF helped design the conditional measures for 
the Spanish government, there is no IMF-exclusive document where this issue is 
addressed. I consider that it is methodologically more sensible to base the analysis on 
Article IV Consultations rather than risking including additional mixed documents where 
IMF’s views might be influenced by other institutions such as the Commission or the 
ECB.  IMF’s Article IV Consultation is an annual report published for each country where 
the institution prints its official position and is the “main instrument through which the 
IMF exercises its bilateral surveillance activity” (Roy and Almeida Ramos 2012). In the 
document, the IMF oversees national policies and introduces new proposals that can later 
be adopted, or not, by the counterparty. These documents will be used for Spain and Italy 
as they imply a more general approach and broader policy goals. Nonetheless, they cannot 
be used in the study of the other group as availability is limited and the number of reports 
available would not provide a large enough sample to withdraw any valid conclusions.23 
In times of crises, when a member applies for an emergency funding line, it is subject not 
only to an initial assessment but also to periodically reviews where the IMF evaluates the 
on-going process as well as proposes new policy solutions. Unlike Article IV 
Consultations, these documents have a stronger legal nature, as the release of additional 
funds is conditional on the accomplishment of pre-established results. Furthermore, when 
a program is officially concluded, the IMF still conducts post-program reviews where it 
evaluates on-going progress and proposes additional measures to consolidate the 
achievements accomplished by the reform programs. As financing packages are country-
specific, the number of documents available for each EMS will vary. These documents 
will be the base of the analysis for Greece, Portugal and Ireland since they all have been 
subject to the same process, thereby providing a more accurate result.  
                                                          
22 Cyprus received a total amount of €10 billion made available on April 2013 by the IMF, the EU and the 
ECB. The IMF ‘only’ contributed with approximately €1 billion (IMF 2013), a substantially smaller 
amount than other programs. 
23 Article IV Consultations are conducted by IMF’s staff, but national governments reserve the right of 
making them publicly available (Roy and Almeida Ramos 2012). 
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Once the quantitative results are obtained, I will withdraw the main conclusions. For this, 
I find necessary to embed these results in a broader context. In addition to bilateral 
surveillance, the IMF conducts a multilateral fiscal policy analysis through global reports 
such as the WEO and Fiscal Monitor reports. They reflect IMF’s official views on global 
dynamics and the Fund’s latest economic forecasts. 
In the next section, results are presented.  
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6. Analysis & Findings 
In this section, results from the study are analysed. The annexe contains the tables with 
the numeric results. This chapter provides the qualitative interpretation of these results to 
answer the research question. To have a more accurate picture, results are addressed first 
on a global policy context and later, by policy area.  
IMF’s preferences are regularly expressed in the WEO and Fiscal Monitor reports. While 
these are strong indications on IMF’s policy preferences, they usually evaluate, rather 
than guide national economic policy. Within this context, the Fund might highlight an 
issue or hail a policy action, but it leaves to members’ authorities the right to apply its 
own approach. Thus, it is not rare to see broad guidelines regarding fiscal policy, rather 
than specific recommendations.  
In the initial stages of the EDC, IMF’s position was exclusively influenced by the old 
estimation of fiscal multipliers as shown by the October 2010 WEO report, which stated 
that “[a] key result is that fiscal consolidation is typically contractionary. A fiscal 
consolidation equal to 1 percent of GDP typically reduces real GDP by about 0.5 percent 
after two years” (IMF 2010a). When embedded in a European context, the IMF decisively 
supported the austerity approach put in place by European institutions. In the same report, 
the IMF claimed that “[f]iscal policies are generally appropriate as currently planned in 
the euro area economies” (IMF 2010a) and that “over the long term, reducing debt is 
likely to be beneficial” (IMF 2010a). At the time, fiscal consolidation and debt 
sustainability seemed to be IMF’s major concerns. This view was extended to 2011, 
although some exceptions were noted. The September 2011 WEO welcomed new 
proposals to tighten fiscal policy (IMF 2011a) while the 2011 Fiscal Monitor advocated 
for complementing fiscal consolidation with fiscally neutral “pro-growth” policies such 
as increasing the VAT in certain products to offset the reduction of payroll taxes aimed 
at stimulating aggregate demand (IMF 2011b). Nonetheless, as risks of contagion 
intensified, fiscal consolidation and the obligation to meet fiscal targets returned as “an 
obvious priority” (IMF 2012a). In the following years, despite advocating for some 
accommodative policies (IMF 2014b) and pro-growth initiatives, IMF’s reports tend to 
go in the direction of fiscal and debt sustainability. In addition, they highlight the need to 
advance into a more effective tax system (IMF 2013a), a more efficient public 
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administration and a more flexible labour market (IMF 2015a). The October 2016 WEO 
Report further emphasises the need in deepening the reforms in these areas (IMF 2016a). 
Although these reports lead to think that the IMF has not departed from the fiscal stance 
characteristic of the Washington Consensus, it is necessary to disaggregate and analyse it 
separately. 
Fiscal Consolidation and Debt Sustainability 
Numeric results reveal that Spain and Italy experienced similar developments, probably 
because of their systemic nature.  Reports at the beginning of the EDC reflect an increased 
attention to all three levels. Explicit mentions to deficit reductions and expenditure cuts 
are recurring in a time when ‘below-one’ fiscal multipliers endorsed such policies. The 
pro-austerity status-quo, represented mainly by German representatives, was barely 
challenged. Likewise, the IMF praised the aggressive consolidation plan designed by the 
Greek authorities in the first bailout program (IMF 2010b). To some extent, the plans put 
in place by the Portuguese and Irish government showed the same pattern, notably on 
expenditure cut recommendations; an IMF that was satisfied with the potential fiscal 
tightening.  
Between 2011 and 2013, among fears that its recommendations are not contributing to 
improving economic conditions, the IMF relaxes its consolidation requirements for Spain 
and Italy while it places its emphasis on debt sustainability.24 In the 2012 Spain Article 
IV Consultation, the IMF suggests that “medium-term targets are broadly appropriate, but 
a smoother path would be more desirable during a period of extreme weakness, when 
multipliers are likely to be particularly large and the tax base soft” (IMF 2012b) 
acknowledging the possibility of alternative fiscal multipliers. Nonetheless, in 2013 it 
admits that “recovery may also benefit from more growth-friendly fiscal measures” (IMF 
2013b). Nonetheless, results show that the IMF slightly intensifies its fiscal policy 
requirements for Portugal and Greece as the EDC places Spain and Italy on a cliff edge 
after the Greek second bailout program is approved. 
After the worst stage of the EDC had passed the IMF placed less emphasis on fiscal 
consolidation and went back to suggesting policy actions which embraced other solutions. 
                                                          
24 Italy had in 2012 a debt-to-GDP ratio of almost 125% while Spanish public deficit was over 10% of its 
annual GDP, an unsustainable number for the Eurozone’s third economy. Data from the WEO Database. 
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The disappointment of the first Greek bail-out pushed the institution into calling for a 
slightly distinct approach. While fiscal consolidation continued to be the underlying 
policy norm, the IMF admitted that the Greek bailout package had relied “far too much 
on discretionary spending cuts” (IMF 2013c). Based on numeric results, it has, to some 
extent, stabilised its consolidation demands on Portugal, Greece and Italy, while it has 
intensified them for Spain. In the latest WEO Reports (IMF 2015b), the Fund calls for 
countries to follow the GSP rules but it also encourages members with enough fiscal space 
to undertake a fiscal expansion  
Based exclusively on fiscal consolidation one could argue that the IMF’s stance has 
changed little throughout these years. Nevertheless, results show that on debt 
sustainability issues, it has adopted a more ambiguous approach.25 It is true that, as debt 
levels spiked, until the end of 2013, IMF’s concerns and recommendations increased, 
notably in Italy and Greece. The later registers in 2013 a primary surplus for the first time 
in years, which might help explain why after 2013, recommendations on the sustainability 
of the debt-to-GDP ratio are relaxed. Simultaneously, calls for increased European 
cooperation in bringing forward debt relief proposals were recurrent over the reviews of 
the second Greek bailout program, which, however, was not to come cheap for the Greek 
economy. It included conditions such as the deepening of structural reforms aimed at 
achieving sustainable public accounts (IMF 2013c). The official stance was that, except 
for some measures such as additional debt relief by the European private banks, fiscal 
consolidation and debt reduction initiatives were still preferred to increased flexibility in 
complying with pre-established rules. In fact, in the fourth review of the second Greek 
bailout program, the IMF affirms that “[t]he assurances from Greece’s European partners 
that they will consider further measures and assistance, if necessary, to reduce debt to 
substantially below 110 percent of GDP by 2022, conditional on Greece’s full 
implementation of all conditions contained in the program, are welcome” (IMF 2013d).  
So far, I have mostly analysed the cases of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Ireland 
deserves a special focus. Results show that, since the beginning of the program, IMF’s 
explicit recommendations, except for a small spike in expenditure reduction measures 
between 2013 and 2015, were reduced over time. This could be the result of two factors; 
                                                          
25 Note that, although it is not part of the study, the IMF strongly recommends the restructuring of 
members’ private debt unsustainable levels. Mentions are plenty throughout the timeline, especially in 
those countries where private debt-to-GDP ratio rank among world’s highest. Since this issue would 
involve a long discussion, I only analyse IMF’s focus on public debt sustainability.  
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first, the improving economic conditions, and secondly, the correct implementation of the 
initial program. They are likely to be related. The post-program reviews show how the 
IMF adopted a more flexible stance towards Ireland’s consolidation efforts. In the first 
post-program review “staff considers that significant additional consolidation should not 
be implemented” (IMF 2014c). Such sentence is nonetheless misleading since it does not 
mean that the IMF calls for expenditure measures. On the contrary, it still advocates for 
fiscal austerity, as shown in the third post-program review: “Ireland’s economic rebound 
is in full swing, yet fiscal restraint must be maintained in 2015” (IMF 2015c). The latest 
review, conducted in early 2017, hails Ireland’s track record in undertaking the fiscal 
consolidation plan and assures that programs objectives are broadly appropriate, serving 
the IMF as a perfect example of how such approach can work. As a result, Ireland has 
averaged a growth of 10% over the past four years.26 The latest example is IMF’s 
opposition to the measures suggested by the new Portuguese ‘pro-growth’ government 
calling for additional stimulus (IMF 2016b). 
Overall, it could be argued that IMF’s approach throughout the process followed a 
common trend. First, they imposed hard restrictions on receiving countries based on their 
views on fiscal multipliers, as shown by WEO reports. As economic conditions improved, 
the IMF called for more flexibility, but always under certain restraints, and within the 
priority of maintaining sustainable public accounts. Another conclusion of this section is 
that, at least regarding the deficit and debt sustainability, the IMF’s tailors its 
recommendations to each EMS’ circumstances. While one could argue that the IMF has 
adopted a more flexible approach over the past few years, but I consider that such 
flexibility is limited and only when there is fiscal space for such. The IMF remains within 
the principles of fiscal consolidation, which is advocated in times of fiscal difficulties, a 
key principle of the Washington Consensus.   
                                                          
26 Such a high rate is caused by the 26% growth of 2015. While it is commonly argued that such a high 
rate is the result of statistical measurement changes, it is still reflected in IMF’s WEO database thereby 
being the official number.  
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Tax Reform 
In its initial stages, fiscal consolidation focused on the expenditure side. For Portugal, 
two-thirds of such program were expenditure-based (IMF 2011c). Likewise, for Italy, it 
was close to three-quarters (IMF 2011d). This pattern aligns with Washington Consensus’ 
guidelines, which prioritise spending cuts to tax hikes (Williamson 1990). Nonetheless, 
measures on the revenue side of the equation were needed to complement the expenditure-
based consolidation. 
The IMF highlights the need for broadening the tax base. Countries with a poor record of 
revenue collection, Greece, Italy and Spain, are explicitly addressed in this area. One of 
the most frequent requests is the need for a proper plan against tax evasion (IMF 2011d, 
2011e, 2013e, 2014d) as well as further measures advocating for tax systems efficiency 
improvements, notably between 2012 and 2015. The IMF specifically suggests measures 
such as the real-estate tax in Italy (IMF 2010c), the carbon tax in Ireland (IMF 2010d) or 
the reduction of housing and energy tax credits in Spain. While the results show that there 
is a small reduction of these recommendations in the most recent reports, the IMF is 
explicitly clear in the need to reform tax codes, accomplish more efficiency in collecting 
taxes and, to reform the judicial system by which tax evasion is processed in order to 
obtain a sustainable revenue stream.  
On the other hand, results show that reforms of the Personal Income Tax (PIT) and the 
VAT were not as common as expected. Reports encode not only increases of such taxes 
but also eliminations of some exceptions and reforms to make them more efficient. 
However, the IMF was not so keen on tax increases themselves but was rather an advocate 
of tax harmonisation to achieve higher trade flows between EMS. Within this context, it 
suggested to countries whose VAT and PIT rates were below ‘European standards’ to 
modify them. For instance, in Spain, the IMF called for an increase in the consumption 
tax and the elimination of certain VAT exceptions (IMF 2010d, 2011f, 2012b). Beyond 
these specific measures, it rarely suggested further actions, other than improving VAT 
collection efficiency and diminishing the risk of tax evasion.  
The third level to analyse to what extent the IMF has shifted to an alternative approach 
regarding tax preferences is to measure how it has behaved in terms of fiscal incentives. 
Results show that, as events unfolded and economic recovery picked up, the IMF strongly 
supported introducing tax incentives to stimulate the economy, which contrasts with its 
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behaviour towards the expenditure-based stimulus. These recommendations range from 
removing certain taxes, lowering PIT thresholds or introducing hiring incentives. One of 
IMF’s preferred measures is the need to reduce the tax wedge, more recently emphasised 
at a global level in the 2016 WEO Reports (IMF 2016a, 2016c).27 This may lead to think 
that the IMF was seeking to stimulate the economy. It must be analysed however within 
other references to such measures. In this sense, it always encouraged them as long as 
they were implemented in a “fiscally neutral manner” (IMF 2013e), ruling out any 
stimulus that would, in the end, damage the long-term prospects for the sustainability of 
public accounts.  
Since an effective tax reform is a must for a sustainable fiscal consolidation, IMF’s 
position on the revenue side follows the same guidelines explained in the expenditure 
one, which means that whenever it is fiscally possible, members should implement tax 
incentives to promote economic growth. Although it is stated that tax incentives are 
preferred to spending stimulus, results continue to show that the IMF keeps the long-term 
sustainability of public accounts and market’s confidence in the system as the golden 
rules of its recommendations, which differs little from what the Washington Consensus 
dictates, namely, broadening the tax base and reducing marginal rates to foster economic 
growth (Williamson 1990). 
Public Sector Reform 
One of the most controversial reforms laid out in the bailout programs were the public-
sector reforms imposed by the IMF and European institutions. Nonetheless, the question 
remains whether it was the IMF exclusively or its partners, namely the Commission and 
the ECB, who pushed for such reforms.  
Results reveal that, except for the initial stages of the programs in oversized public sectors 
such as Italy, Greece and Spain, and certain moments during the Greek second bailout, 
mentions to civil employment reductions or freezes were limited compared to other policy 
areas. In fact, in the Greek case, arguably the largest public-sector-to-GDP in the 
Eurozone, the IMF advocated for a “one-to-one rule” (IMF 2011g). When reports are 
deeply studied one can find that references to this area did not exactly support the 
                                                          
27 The Tax wedge is defined as “the ratio between the amount of taxes paid by an average single worker 
(a single person at 100% of average earnings) without children and the corresponding total labour cost for 
the employer” https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-wedge.htm 
Álvaro Portes Navarro 
33 
 
reduction of the public sector but rather the “support of a modern and well-functioning 
state” (Ibid.). In this direction, the IMF called for introducing regulatory and control 
measures to increase public sector’s efficiency to align Southern economies with its 
Northern neighbours’.  
On the other issue, particularly pensions and benefits reform, the IMF took a more active 
stand, as recommendations are constantly introduced in the reports with the goal of 
putting the pension systems on a “viable footing” (IMF 2013f). A very strong emphasis 
was put at the beginning of the EDC in countries whose pension systems had not been 
reformed in a long time, namely Spain, Italy and Greece. Portugal had accomplished an 
efficient pension system reform in 2007, which was praised by the IMF. Spain’s 2010 
and Italy’s 2011 pension reforms, which included features such as the increase of the 
retirement age to 67 years old, the tightening of the criteria for early retirement, and the 
introduction of a sustainability factor, were also positively addressed by the IMF (IMF 
2011f). Furthermore, it also called for complementing the public pension scheme with 
private pension funds to alleviate the pressure on the sustainability of public accounts.  
Overall, in comparison to the previous policy areas, the IMF was characterised for its 
appeals to ‘efficiency’ and ‘long-term sustainability’ of the public sector. Although it 
looks very similar to the language used in the fiscal consolidation and tax reform domain, 
it does not necessarily support scaling the public sector down. It is evident that, as results 
show, under certain circumstances, some public-sector cuts and employment reductions, 
were advocated, but it could be argued, that in this area, the IMF was relatively softer and 
more flexible that the European institutions.  
Labour Market Reform 
Although labour market reforms do not fall exclusively under the scope of fiscal policy, 
they affect to the level of revenues of the State and the speed of the economic recovery. 
Thus, it is one of the key issues addressed by international actors, being the IMF no 
exception. 
In the European case, the IMF has adopted a different position to each of the EMS. Results 
show that despite diverging trends in labour market recommendations, they peaked in 
2012, during the worst times of the EDC. 
Álvaro Portes Navarro 
34 
 
In the cases of the systemic economies, specifically Italy and Spain, the IMF was insistent 
between 2010 and 2012 in tackling the structural weaknesses of their labour markets. 
Among other measures, it placed its efforts on the revision of wages levels, which it 
claimed was above productivity levels (IMF 2011d, 2011f). Furthermore, it emphasised 
the need to reform the collective bargaining model, the elimination of labour market 
duality and the need to tackle the lack of flexibility which blocked higher participation 
rates. According to the results, mentions addressing these issues decreased over the years, 
partly because of the two labour reforms in both countries in 2012, which were later 
praised by the IMF. Nonetheless, the Spanish and the Italian labour markets are still under 
constant scrutiny. The Fund still insists on “keeping wage growth aligned with 
productivity and external competitiveness developments” (IMF 2015d) and “prioritizing 
firm-level agreements over higher-level ones; making it somewhat easier for firms in 
economic difficulties to ‘opt-out’ from higher level agreements; and limiting ultra-
activity (the period during which an expired agreement would remain valid)” (IMF 
2016d).  
In Greece and Portugal, results show that the major focus was between 2011 and 2014. 
Even though the IMF placed more attention on this topic, it still exhibits an ambiguous 
approach. In Greece’s reports, it stated that “labour has shouldered too much of the burden 
as lower wages have not resulted in lower prices” (IMF 2013c), which contrasts with the 
Portuguese case, where the IMF has endorsed the freezing of public employees’ salaries 
(IMF 2012e). More recently, it has warned the new government against the negative 
impact of raising the minimum wage (IMF 2017b). In Ireland, the Fund pushed for wage 
growth to remain flat, but this position has somehow softened as the country shows 
improving economic conditions. 
Overall, results depict an IMF strongly worried about labour market conditions during 
the first years of the EDC. It advocated for the liberalisation of the market, mainly by 
recommending increasing flexibility in the negotiations of wages. While this aligns with 
the principles of the Washington Consensus, it is also clear that the institution has 
softened its perspective over the last few quarters. 
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7. Conclusions & Future 
This document has provided an extensive study on one of today’s most relevant topics at 
a European level, its economic governance framework. As the most influential economic 
international institution, the IMF has played a crucial role in the design of mechanisms 
aimed at softening the effects of the EDC. Understanding the principles behind IMF’s 
intervention may help to establish the achievements and failures of the Washington 
Consensus, which would ultimately ensure a more effective response to a future crisis.  
I have first described the academic debate around the Washington Consensus and its 
evolution, with a special focus on the 2000s debate and the effect caused by the GFC.  
Right after, I have explained the reasons behind IMF’s involvement in European affairs. 
Political differences have been found between the Northern and Southern member states, 
with special mention to the cultural differences within the Franco-German axis. 
Furthermore, and despite the later cooperation between the institutions, it is also clear that 
some European officials, notably within the ECB, were not always in favour of involving 
the IMF. Nonetheless, the systemic nature adopted by the EDC left them with no choice. 
Within this context, I have analysed IMF’s conditionality, with a special focus on the late 
transition from its traditional rigidity towards more flexible and broader guidelines. The 
goal was to test whether this new approach is translated to IMF’s intervention in the 
Eurozone. 
To analyse this possible phenomenon, I designed a method which attempts to eliminate 
the risk of falling into an incorrect sample selection and the subjective interpretation of 
policy recommendations. I focused on members’ fiscal policy rather than monetary, 
financial and structural issues. To accomplish a more detailed result, I disaggregated 
fiscal policy into nine narrower policy actions. The analysis was conducted in two stages; 
first at a global scale, by using IMF’s WEO and Fiscal Monitor reports, and second, 
individually, based on each country’s Article IV reports and programs’ reviews. 
Results depict ambiguous trends. At a global scale, reports show that, with a few 
exceptions, the IMF continues to follow the old paradigm and that two factors highly 
influence its recommendations: First, economic conditions, and secondly, the magnitude 
of estimated fiscal multipliers. As a result, the initial stages of the EDC, the IMF 
prioritised balanced public accounts to the so-called ‘pro-growth’ policies. In this sense, 
it has followed the principles laid out by Williamson.  
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Regarding tax policy, results show that programs were considerably less insistent on this 
area than in the expenditure side. Results show that, in this area, the IMF aligns with the 
principles established in the Washington Consensus. First, advocating for broadening the 
tax base to increase revenue streams in complicated economic times and secondly, 
insisting that stimulus must come in the form of tax incentives, including lowering tax 
thresholds and reducing the tax wedge rather than in expenditure measures.  
It is probably in the public-sector domain where the IMF diverges more from the set of 
policies proposed by Williamson. Results show that recommendations have focused on 
improving efficiency standards rather than merely scaling the public sector down. On the 
other hand, it has put a strong emphasis on pension systems reform, urging members to 
introduce sustainability mechanisms and encouraging them to incentivise the 
complementation with private pension schemes. 
Finally, on the labour market field, its position has been softened over time, especially 
for Greece and Ireland, but, as results show for other countries, the IMF is still a strong 
advocate of wage moderation and flexible wage-setting frameworks. 
Overall, two major conclusions can be withdrawn from the study. First and foremost, it 
can be concluded that, to a significant extent, the IMF continues to adopt the same 
approach that it did in the past. Results show that only regarding the public-sector reform 
there is enough evidence to state that there has been a transition towards a more flexible 
framework. Thus, the ‘paradigm shift’ away from the Washington Consensus is not only 
limited but also unlikely to be completed soon at a European level. Secondly, the study 
reveals that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies criticised by many economists, is to a 
substantial extent, not present at a European level. While there is evidence that the IMF 
still follows certain guidelines, it is also true that programs have displayed significant 
differences at similar times. The Fund has adapted to each country’s economic conditions, 
as shown especially by the Irish case. 
What Lies Ahead? 
It seems obvious that both institutions have benefited from each other in the creation of a 
new governance framework. As explained in the second chapter, the Fund has been able 
to embed its programs in a broader policy context, and the EU has acquired its first 
experience in handling a major global crisis as a Union. Today’s EU firewalls against 
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future economic crises are a true reflection of IMF’s structures and practices, which 
would induce to think that future cooperation is locked in, but in fact, the future remains 
uncertain for two reasons.  
First, the next round of the Greek bailout. Greece continues to be a headache for European 
officials. Although data suggests that the situation has improved considerably, collateral 
risks from previous programs still exist. The need for enabling an additional funding line 
has revived some of the differences between members, the Commission, the ECB and the 
IMF. Although the first disbursement of this bailout, consisting of a €8.5 billion loan, has 
been already agreed, some frictions remain, as shown by the German finance minister, 
who blamed Greece for the slow pace of the negotiations (Buerguin 2017). While the 
agreement is a significant step forward, as it allows the Greek government to meet its July 
obligations, IMF’s involvement is only partial, meaning that it approves and joins the 
program but the availability of IMF’s funds will be conditional to future evaluations of 
Greece’s debt sustainability.  
The official status of Greece’s debt is what keeps both parties confronted. The EU wants 
IMF’s reputation, expertise and credibility on board, but the Fund needs Greece’s debt to 
be declared unsustainable which would, inevitably, involve the implementation of another 
debt relief plan, something that neither Germany, the Netherlands or Finland, among 
others, are willing to accept. The institutional argument claims that IMF’s internal rules 
prevent it from loaning money to countries whose debt is unsustainable. If it agreed to 
unlock additional financial help, it would compromise its reputation, and it would face 
claims of preferential treatment towards Greece. The technical argument indicates that, 
despite Greece’s recent performance regarding a primary surplus, which sufficiently 
meets previous targets, the IMF is still sceptical on whether this trend can be sustained 
over time (Sotiris 2017). In this sense, IMF’s views align with the Greek authorities on 
the problem, but not the solution. While the second demands a nominal write-off its debt 
face value, the first, with the support of European leaders, advocates for an improved debt 
management, which would take place in two stages. First, shielding debt from expected 
interest rates hikes, and secondly, limiting interest payments and extending loan 
maturities (Dendrinou 2017). The Greek government, who also seeks debt relief measures 
because it would mean having access to ECB’s QE program, is likely to oppose such 
position. 
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Markets have so far welcomed the agreement, but further talks regarding debt 
sustainability are unlikely to resume any time before the German general elections in 
September since Merkel’s government will not risk securing an agreement that does not 
satisfy the German public opinion (M. Khan 2017). 
The second major threat to future relations is the stand adopted by the new US 
government. The new administration has openly questioned the role of numerous 
international institutions, including the IMF. The Fund’s Managing Director has already 
criticised Trump’s stance on global trade (IMF 2017c). The institution has traditionally 
been a strong advocate of globalisation, especially in the field of financial markets.  
From an institutional point of view, the US holds the largest voting power at IMF’s 
Executive Board, which, together with the Board of Governors, approves major 
programs. Normally, these are made based on consensus, but if it goes to a vote, it is 
almost crucial to have the US on your side. If the conditions of the Greek bailout program 
do not satisfy the Washington Administration, there may be a possibility of having the 
IMF opposed to the program, even if its current demands are met. European leaders are 
nonetheless, positive about future relations. Wolfgang Schäuble admits that they will be 
a “little more difficult” but is confident that in the end, the “substance” of American 
policy will prevail and will make both blocks cooperate in this domain (Miller, et al. 
2017).  
The EU must, however, be prepared. After the UK’s decision to leave the EU, arguably 
the most reluctant member to move into a supranational economic governance 
framework, some proposals have been brought forward to advance towards the creation 
of a European Monetary Fund, which would unbind the EU from the influence of the US 
in the IMF. What seems an appealing solution, would involve taking several pre-steps, 
including the deepening of the banking union and tackling the governance weaknesses of 
the current ESM, the stepping stone to the creation of the European Monetary Fund (Sapir 
and Schoenmaket 2017). Although the future remains uncertain, it is undeniable that the 
new EU-US relationship will shape the future of a Washington Consensus that has been 
shaping global crisis management for almost three decades.
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8. Annex 
ITALY28 ARTICLE IV 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
Fiscal Consolidation + Sustainability 
Reduction of Fiscal Deficit/GDP 8 6 2 3 1 0 0 
Reduction of Public Expenditure/Spending 
Reviews 
20 23 19 9 8 9 6 
Public Debt Sustainability Measures 11 2 5 9 10 9 8 
 
Tax Revenue 
Broadening the Tax Base 4 11 8 18 9 5 6 
Increase on income or consumption taxes 0 2 3 1 1 0 1 
Increasing Tax Incentives 3 3 11 12 9 10 6 
 
Public Sector Reform 
Reduction or freezing of Civil Employment 5 5 5 3 5 3 4 
Reduction or elimination of benefits and 
pensions 
20 9 4 0 4 2 1 
Labour Market Reform Wages: Level, Structure and Public Sector 4 7 8 5 3 4 4 
IMF’s TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS 75 68 65 60 50 42 36 
 
SPAIN29 ARTICLE IV 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
Fiscal Consolidation + Sustainability 
Reduction of Fiscal Deficit/GDP 5 8 4 2 4 3 2 
Reduction of Public Expenditure/Spending 
Reviews 
7 10 8 3 4 1 5 
Public Debt Sustainability Measures 4 5 5 5 4 6 9 
 
Tax Revenue 
Broadening the Tax Base 4 2 5 5 8 3 4 
Increase on income or consumption taxes 3 2 3 2 4 1 2 
Increasing Tax Incentives 5 0 1 4 6 4 5 
 
Public Sector Reform 
Reduction or freezing of Civil Employment 1 2 3 2 1 0 0 
Reduction or elimination of benefits and 
pensions 
7 4 0 3 0 0 0 
Labour Market Reform Wages: Level, Structure and Public Sector 12 7 10 7 5 5 3 
IMF’s TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS 48 40 39 33 36 23 30 
                                                          
28 (IMF 2010c, 2011d, 2012c, 2013g, 2014e, 2015e, 2016e) 
29 (IMF 2010d, 2011f, 2012b, 2013b, 2014d, 2015d, 2016d) 
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GREECE II31 
 
AGREEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED FUND 
FACILITY, REVIEWS AND EVALUATION 
2013 2014 
Staff Report on 
Request for EFF 
First and Second 
Reviews 
Third Review Fourth 
Review 
Fifth Review 
 
Fiscal Consolidation + 
Sustainability 
Reduction of Fiscal Deficit/GDP 3 1 0 0 0 
Reduction of Public Expenditure/Spending Reviews 9 6 4 5 3 
Public Debt Sustainability Measures 7 10 6 4 3 
 
Tax Revenue 
Broadening the Tax Base 8 6 4 6 4 
Increase on income or consumption taxes 3 3 0 0 2 
Increasing Tax Incentives 3 3 2 0 2 
Public Sector Reform Reduction or freezing of Civil Employment 5 2 2 3 2 
Reduction or elimination of benefits and pensions 5 3 1 0 1 
Labour Market Reform Wages: Level, Structure and Public Sector. 9 4 1 1 1 
IMF’s TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS 52 38 20 19 18 
                                                          
30 (IMF 2010b, 2010e, 2010f, 2011g, 2011h, 2011e) 
31 (IMF 2012d, 2013c, 2013h, 2013d, 2014f)  
 
GREECE I30 
 
STAND-BY AGREEMENT, REVIEWS AND 
EVALUATION 
2010 2011 
Staff Report on 
Request for SBA 
First 
Review 
Second 
Review 
Third 
Review 
Fourth 
Review 
Fifth 
Review 
 
Fiscal Consolidation + 
Sustainability 
Reduction of Fiscal Deficit/GDP 3 3 4 2 2 2 
Reduction of Public Expenditure/Spending 
Reviews 
9 11 7 8 7 9 
Public Debt Sustainability Measures 6 3 4 3 10 10 
 
Tax Revenue 
Broadening the Tax Base 8 8 9 7 8 8 
Increasing income or consumption taxes 3 0 1 1 2 2 
Introducing Tax Incentives 0 1 1 0 4 4 
Public Sector Reform Reduction or freezing of Civil Employment 3 3 4 2 6 6 
Reduction or elimination of benefits and pensions 8 4 5 2 3 4 
Labour Market Reform Wages: Level, Structure and Public Sector. 8 3 2 4 8 10 
IMF’s TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS 48 36 37 29 50 55 
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PORTUGAL33 
 
EFF POST PROGRAM REVIEWS 
2015 2016 2017 
First Post Program 
Review 
Second Post 
Program Review 
Third Post Program 
Review 
Fifth Post Program 
Review 
 
Fiscal Consolidation + 
Sustainability 
Reduction of Fiscal Deficit/GDP 3 2 2 1 
Reduction of Public Expenditure/Spending Reviews 3 6 3 2 
Public Debt Sustainability Measures 2 4 4 3 
 
Tax Revenue 
Broadening the Tax Base 3 1 0 0 
Increase on income or consumption taxes 0 1 1 0 
Increasing Tax Incentives 3 1 1 2 
Public Sector Reform Reduction or freezing of Civil Employment 2 2 2 1 
Reduction or elimination of benefits and pensions 5 1 2 1 
Labour Market Reform Wages: Level, Structure and Public Sector 5 2 2 3 
IMF’s TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS 26 20 17 13 
                                                          
32 (IMF 2011i, 2011j, 2012e, 2012f, 2013e, 2013i, 2014g) 
33 (IMF 2015f, 2015g, 2016b, 2017b) 
 
PORTUGAL32 
 
THREE-YEAR ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE 
EXTENDED FUND FACILITY 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Request for 
the EFF 
First 
Review 
Third 
Review 
Fifth 
Review 
Seventh 
Review 
Eighth & 
Ninth 
Review 
Eleventh 
Review 
 
Fiscal Consolidation + 
Sustainability 
Reduction of Fiscal Deficit/GDP 1 1 1 1 2 5 2 
Reduction of Public Expenditure/Spending 
Reviews 
7 4 2 2 3 3 1 
Public Debt Sustainability Measures 2 3 2 2 3 3 5 
 
Tax Revenue 
Broadening the Tax Base 4 2 2 1 3 2 2 
Increase on income or consumption taxes 4 0 0 2 1 1 1 
Increasing Tax Incentives 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 
Public Sector Reform Reduction or freezing of Civil Employment 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 
Reduction or elimination of benefits and pensions 1 0 0 1 2 2 3 
Labour Market Reform Wages: Level, Structure and Public Sector 4 2 2 4 3 5 3 
IMF’s TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS 25 13 13 16 21 24 18 
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IRELAND35 
 
EFF POST PROGRAM REVIEWS 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
First Post 
Program Review 
Second Post 
Program 
Review 
Third Post 
Program 
Review 
Fourth Post 
Program 
Review 
Sixth Post 
Program 
Review 
 
Fiscal Consolidation + 
Sustainability 
Reduction of Fiscal Deficit/GDP 0 1 0 0 0 
Reduction of Public Expenditure/Spending Reviews 4 5 2 0 1 
Public Debt Sustainability Measures 2 3 3 3 3 
 
Tax Revenue 
Broadening the Tax Base 1 0 1 1 1 
Increase on income or consumption taxes 1 0 0 0 0 
Increasing Tax Incentives 0 0 1 0 1 
Public Sector Reform Reduction or freezing of Civil Employment 2 1 1 0 0 
Reduction or elimination of benefits and pensions 0 0 0 0 0 
Labour Market Reform Wages: Level, Structure and Public Sector 0 1 1 0 0 
FISCAL POLICY TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS 10 11 9 4 6 
                                                          
34 (IMF 2010d, 2011k, 2011l, 2012g, 2012h, 2013j, 2013k) 
35 (IMF 2014c, 2015h, 2015c, 2016f, 2017d) 
 
IRELAND34 
 
ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED 
FUND FACILITY 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Request for 
the EFF 
First & Second 
Review 
Fourth 
Review 
Sixth 
Review 
Eighth 
Review 
Tenth 
Review 
Twelfth 
Review 
 
Fiscal Consolidation + 
Sustainability 
Reduction of Fiscal Deficit/GDP 3 2 2 0 1 0 1 
Reduction of Public Expenditure/Spending 
Reviews 
5 4 5 6 4 1 3 
Public Debt Sustainability Measures 10 6 8 6 7 6 4 
 
Tax Revenue 
Broadening the Tax Base 5 2 2 2 3 1 4 
Increase on income or consumption taxes 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 
Increasing Tax Incentives 1 2 0 2 2 0 2 
Public Sector Reform Reduction or freezing of Civil Employment 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 
Reduction or elimination of benefits and pensions 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Labour Market Reform Wages: Level, Structure and Public Sector 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 
FISCAL POLICY TOTAL RECOMMENDATIONS 31 18 23 22 24 11 19 
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